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This article elaborates the theoretical relationship between economic need
and state development policy adoption, and presents empirical analysis of
the adoption of state revenue bond financing programs between 1969 and
1979 using event history analysis techniques . Contrary to the conventional
wisdom that state development policy adoption is driven by political
competition or an "arms race " among neighboring states, we found that
partisan control and competition from neighboring states did not affect the
adoption of revenue bond programs . Relative state personal income is the
one significant variable in the model. Low income states, where new
development would generate the most economic benefits, were most likely
to adopt revenue bond financing.

re state adoptions of economic development policies a
response to economic or political demands? The answer to
this question is critical for efforts to develop and test
explanations of state policy making and policy adoption. In addition,
identification of the extent to which development policy adoptions are
linked to economic conditions can provide a baseline to assess the
potential efficiency of state development policy. There is growing
evidence that state and local economic development policies can
stimulate at least some economic outputs (Plaut and Pluta 1983;
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Feiock 1991; Bartik 1991). Nevertheless, critics claim that adoptions
of development programs are not a response to economic need.
Rather , development policy adoptions are more often viewed as
symbolic activities or the result of a counterproductive arms-race
mentality by state political leaders. Dennis Grady 's (1987) empirical
analysis of state development policies in the mid 1970s provides
strong support for this argument.
Identifying the link between economic need and adoption of
state economic development policies has both theoretical and applied
importance for understanding the efficiency of development
policymaking. State economic development policy might be both
efficient, in the sense of achieving positive-sum economic gains, and
progressive in that disadvantaged groups disproportionately benefit
(Feiock, Dubnick and Mitchell 1993; Bartik 1991). A critical, yet
untested, assumption of this argument is that economic development
programs are directed to states and localities suffering economic
distress , in which there is high demand or "willingness to pay" for
more rapid growth. If incentive offerings are not related to need , the
result would be an inefficient allocation of new development.
The relationship between economic need and adoption of
development policies is critical ; if policy adoption is responsive to
economic hardship , the result may be both efficient and progressive.
But, if development policy adoption is responsive to political, rather
than economic conditions , states not experiencing economic problems
may attract growth with development incentives, creating allocational
as well as economic inefficiencies. This article elaborates the
theoretical relationship between economic need and state development
policy adoption, and presents empirical analysis of the adoption of
state revenue bond financing programs between 1969 and 1979 using
event history analysis techniques.
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STATEDEVELOPMENTPOLICY
Many have questioned whether state and local policies can
influence sub-national growth patterns. While no consensus exists,
most recent work suggests they can. Within the last ten years, there
has been an accumulation of empirical evidence that state economic
development policies do influence growth (for a review see Feiock,
Dubnick and Mitchell 1993). Development policies are intended to
influence a firm ' s cost fimction. While the effect of subsidies is only
a very small part of a firm's cost calculus, subsidies may have a
significant marginal effect across similar jurisdictions.
If state governments have tools to marginally influence
patterns of economic and population growth, the next question is when
and if intervening in the market is desirable for them. Neoclassical
economists argue that government sponsored development incentives
reduce economic welfare and misallocate investment. Baum (1987)
demonstrates that, by relaxing the assumptions of the classical model
to include imperfect competition and limited residential mobility, state
and local growth promotion can improve the social efficiency of the
economic development process at both the state and national level.
Because the social benefits and costs of growth are excluded from
private investment decisions, state development policy may internalize
these social externalities thus improving efficiency. Feiock, Dubnick
and Mitchell (1993) contend that state growth competition is not zerosum at the regional, national, or international level. Growth policies
may generate positive economic gains at both the state and the
national level by accelerating market adjustment processes.
In a dynamic model of growth and decline , subsidies
may be used to speed up market adjustment processes . In
particular , a declining community may use subsidies to
attract investment in new export industries at a faster rate
and with less pain than it would be attracted by ordinary
market process , declining wages and prices for state
goods ...generating positive net benefits (Baum 1987 ,
354).
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Empirical evidence provides some support (Morgan and
Hackbart 1974; Bartik 1991). Tim Bartik (1991) presents evidence
that under conditions of high unemployment , the effects of local
development policy are positive-sum. Moreover , Bartik reports the
effects of development policies on wages were greater in percentage
terms for African-Americans and less educated workers . Nevertheless,
the conditions necessary for positive-sum economic gains or
progressive benefits have not been clearly specified in previous
studies. In Bartik ' s analysis progressive effects of growth occurred in
locations with high levels of unemployment. This suggests that when
and where there is low demand for growth due to a tight labor market,
state adoption of economic development policies would decrease both
economic and allocative efficiency.
AB consumers of economic development, states seek to
maximize their economic interests by choosing to adopt or not adopt
specific economic development policies . While Paul Peterson ( 1981)
contends sub-national governments have a uniform incentive to pursue
economic growth despite economic needs and political demand, we
argue the benefits of growth will vary among states. Not every
development policy benefits the average taxpayer. This is clearly
evident from case studies of growth politics (Swanstrom 1985; Stone
and Saunders 1987). Moreover , empirical analysis at the city level has
consistently demonstrated that development policy varies substantially
across cities and that this variation is strongly associated with
economic distress (Rubin and Rubin 1987; Bowman 1988; Green and
Fleischmann 1989; Sharp 1991; Clingermayer and Feiock 1991).
State governments subsidize business firms' investment and
jobs creation. Unless a state ' s marginal benefit from growth equals
marginal economic and social costs, such competition is inefficient.
Since taxpayers will be willing to pay more for development in some
areas than others (Rubin and Rubin, 1987), the economic benefits of
growth increase with the severity of economic dislocations suffered by
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states. In states with low incomes, high unemployment, and
discouragedworkers, the demand for growth will be great.
Political,rather than economic,criteria are often the basis for
developmentincentivesbecause developmentpolicy is formulatedby
self-interestedpublic officialsin a contextof resource and information
constraints. The political incentives of governors and members of
legislaturesto get re-elected can result in development policies that
depart from the preference of the average taxpayer. Previous work at
the local level demonstrates that, because economic development
provides visible benefits for which politicians can claim credit and
reward constituents or supporters, local officials have incentives to
pursue growth even when the economic costs exceed their benefits
(Feiock 1989, 1992).

EMPIRICALANALYSIS
The policy adoption examined here is state revenue bond
financing programs. Revenue bonds have been one of the most
important development incentives available to state and local
governments.Borrowing from the work ofLowi (1964), Ambrosius
classifiesrevenue bond programs as a distributivepolicy that provides
targetablebenefits to particulareconomicinterests(Ambrosius 1989).
Following the work of Berry and Berry (1990), we conceive
of a program or policy adoptionby a state as an event that may or may
not occur within a particularperiod of time. For any state we seek to
determine the probability of adoption during the time period using
Event History Analysis (EHA) techniques.We use EHA to examine
the occurrence of the adoption of a revenue bond program at a
particular point in time. In EHA, the data is a longitudinal record of
when an event occurred.Until a state adopts a revenue bond program
it remains "at risk" of the event occurring. The variable to be
explained is called the "haz.ardrate" and is defined as the probability
VOL. 261998
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that a state adopts a revenue bond program in period t, given that it is
at risk at that time. Because the hazard rate is unobserved, the
dependentvariable in this analysisis a dummy variablecoded one for
the year a stateadoptsa state revenuebond financing(SRBF)program
and coded zero otherwise.Table 1reports the statesadoptingrevenue
bond financing and the year of adoption.

Table 1
States that Adopted State Revenue Bond Financing
During the 1969-1979 Period
State

Year of Adoption

Pennsylvania

1970

Vermont

1970

Connecticut

1972

New Jersey

1974

Michigan

1975

Illinois

1976

South Carolina

1976

Kentucky

1978

Nevada

1978

South Dakota

1978

Louisiana

1979
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Empirical Models and Hypotheses
Two indicators of demand for economic development are
included in this analysis. Toe first is an income based measure of
economic need. We use the ratio of state per capita income to national
per capita which reflects a state's "relative income" (RELATIVE
INCOME; ,} This measures two aspects of how state economic
position affects the likelihood of adoption. Relative income is an
objective structural indicator of the well-being of individuals in a state
compared with a common standard-the well-being of individuals in
the nation as a whole. We believe that because it is a relative measure
and permits greater accuracy in comparisons among states, relative
income has the added dimension of more completely capturing
policymakers' perceptions of a state's well-being. 1
The second measure of economic demand is based on state
unemployment. We created a variable to capture the "recency effect"
of unemployment rates (Isaac and Carlson 1986). Specifically, we
used the sum of unemployment at year t and year t-1 (RECENT
UNEMPLOYMENT;.,) reasoning that recent unemployment figures,
rather than those from the current or the previous year only, actuate
economic development policy making because policy makers cannot
easily claim that a particular year of bad unemployment figures is
simply an aberration-a "down" year-soon to be followed by an
upturn in the near future.
Political demand variables are included in the model as well.
The first is one-partycontrolof state government.We employ a pair
of dummy variables to capture the effect of having the governorship,
and both houses of the legislature controlled by Republicans

'Grady (! 987) employed the state unemployment rate minus the national rate
to capture relative unemployment , reasoning that this is the operationalization that directly
affects policy makers because this is how unemployment is often presented in the popular
media .
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(REPUBLICAN CONTROL;.,) or Democrats (DEMOCRAT
CONIROL ;.,).2
The second political demand variable is an indicator of
regional development competition. To capture the effects of regional
competition among states, we employ the regional competition
variables created by Berry and Berry (1990). We test both of their
operationalizations of regional competition: "the number of states
sharing a border with state i that had adopted a lottery [in our case, the
economic development policy] prior to year t" (REGIONAL
COMPETITION;); and, ''the percentage of states sharing a border that
had adopted a lottery" (REGIONAL COMPE1TI1ON2;) (Berry and
Berry 1990, 405). This yields four hypotheses for empirical testing.

Hypothesis 1:

Higher income states are less likely to adopt
state revenue bond financing (SRBF).

Hypothesis 2:

States with greater recent unemployment are
more likely to adopt state revenue bond
financing.

Hypothesis 3:

Democrat-controlled state governments are
more likely to adopt state revenue bond
financing.

Hypothesis 4:

States with greater regional competition in
economic development policy adoption are
more likely to adopt state revenue bond
financing.

2
The simultaneous inclusion of both of these variables did not result in
multicollinearity problems.
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Methods and Data Sources

Event history analysiswas employedto test the models because
it is appropriate for addressing why economic development policy
adoptions occur when they do. Excellent surveys of these techniques
(Allison 1984; Yamaguchi 1991) and their utility in addressing the .
timingof statepolicy adoptions(Berryand Berry 1990;Pavalko 1989)
are detailedelsewhere,but generally,they involveregression analysis
of "a longitudinal record of when an event happened to a sample of
individuals or collectivities"-i.e., event histories (Allison 1984, 9).
Discrete time event history models were estimated because the data
are measured at distinct and even time periods. The data are pooled
cross-sections for the period 1969-1979, and the unit of analysis is
state-years.A state contributesdata beginning in 1969 until it adopts
the policy, at which point the remainingdata are (right)censored-the
state no longer contributesdata to estimate a model.3
We use logistic regression because the dependent variables are
dichotomous, and derive parameter estimates using maximum
likelihood estimation.Two statisticsare employedto evaluate model
fit.We employthe Log-likelihoodchi-squarestatistic,which functions
similarly to the F-test in OLS regression to indicate the statistical
significanceof the independentvariables as a group. We also use the
AIC measure (Akaike 1974, 1987),which adjusts the Log-likelihood
chi-squaremeasure for the number of observationsand independent
variables employed in the models, to compare the statistical strength
of competing models of the same data.4 A model which has a smaller
AIC value than a competitor,ceterisparibus, is a better fit.

3
lt was necessary to have the period of study include 1969 because one-year lags
are used in some of the independent variables and both policies examined here include
states that adopted in 1970.

'The SAS LOGISTIC procedure was employed witch provides the AIC and
other quantitative measures for assessing model fit.
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RESULTS
The results of estimating the state revenue bond financing are
presented in Table 2. These findings provide support for the economic
demand explanation , but not the political demand explanation.
Although the significant Log-likelihood chi-square statistic indicates
that the model is statistically significant , only one variable-the
relative income of the state-is statistically significant. States with

Table 2
Logit Maximum Likelihood Model Estimates
of State Revenue Bond Financing (SRBF)
Independent Variable

ML Estimate

RELATIVE INCOME ;,,

-2.67 1

t-value
-2.52

REPUBLICANCONfROL i,I

.73

.63

DEMOCRAT CONTR.OU·'

.40

.61

REGIONAL COMPETITIONl ;,,

.43

.75

RECENT UNEMPLOYMENT ;,,

.11

1.38

5.49 1

4.54

Intercept
N-295
-2(Log-likelihood ratio) 9.601 *
*p < .05
Tp < .01
Ip < .001
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higher relative per capita personal incomes are less likely to adopt a
state revenue bond financing measure, after controllingfor the effects
of regional competition, political party control of state government,
and employment. While in the hypothesized direction, the coefficient
for unemployment fell short of statistical significance.
The political demand explanation, however, is not supported.
Partisan controlled state government did not affect the likelihood of
adoption of a state revenue bond financing policy. Further , the
likelihood of adoption is not increased significantlyas the number of
border states (nor the percentage of border states) that have adopted a
state revenue bond financing policy increases.
DISCUSSION

While state economies have experienced renewed growth in
recent years, developmentpolitics and policyremain leadingissues for
state government.Growth policy is particularlycriticalto sub-national
politics because economic growth has not translated into the expected
employment opportunities. While some states recovered faster than
others from the early 1990's recession, in even these fast-growing
states, employment growth rates were less than those forecasted from
increases in productivity. The findings from this article suggest that
the politics of state development is not dominatedby political forces.
We are somewhat circumspect in our conclusions due to the
modest findings and the limitations of the empirical analysis.
Nevertheless, the finding presented here provides interesting insights
into development policy adoption. First, contrary to the conventional
wisdom that state development policy adoption is driven by political
competition or an "arms race" among neighboring states, we found
that partisan control and competition from neighboring states had no
effect on this policy adoption.
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The results also provide some insight into the efficiency of state
economic development policymaking. Relative state personal income
is the one significant variable in the model. States with low relative
personal income , the states in which new development would generate
the most economic benefits, were most likely to adopt revenue bond
financing in this period. Nevertheless, the effect of unemployment
were not significant. The fact that development policy adoption is not
responsive to unemployment suggests that the distribution of benefits
is less progressive than has been maintained (Bartick 1991).
Development policy adoption may be more responsive to the
economic demands of capital rather than labor. This is consistent with
studies of the economic outcomes of state and local development that
have found that the impact of development incentives on capital
investment is much greater than on job creation. Extending this
analysis to a broader set of policies and expanding the model
specification to include a broader set of political and economic
variables might provide clearer evidence regarding the efficiency of
state economic development policy adoption .
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